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PUBLIC POLICY AND PRIVATE CUPIDITY:
BERLE AND MEANS RE-VISIONED
Allan C. Hutchinson*
“The Berle-Means corporation...is an adaptation, not a
necessity.”
Mark Roe

1

The seventy-fifth anniversary of the publication of Adolph A. Berle
and Gardiner C. Means’ The Modern Corporation and Private
Property in 1932 will soon be upon us. This classic work is
universally acknowledged as one of law’s canonical texts. While it
has aptly been described as “arguably the most influential book in
U.S. business history,”2 its importance is not merely as an
historical curiosity: it has remained a mainstay of corporate law
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MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL
ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 286-87 (1994).
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Peter Drucker, Reckoning with the Pension Revolution, HARV. BUS. REV.
106 at 114 (March/April 1991). In a similar vein, it has been said that “no field
of American law has ever been so totally dominated by one work as the
corporation law area by the Berle and Means classic.” Henry G. Manne,
Intellectual Styles and the Evolution of American Corporate Law in
ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM: THE ECONOMIC APPROACH APPLIED
OUTSIDE THE FIELD OF ECONOMICS 219 at 223 (Gerard Radnitzky and
Peter Bernholz eds. 1987).
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and scholarship up to the present day. While its detailed analysis
of corporate governance and the particulars of its reform proposals
have become less important over time, it still exerts extensive
conceptual influence. The fact that it is no longer referenced as
frequently is less an indication of its dated quality and more a
testament to its foundational status. Indeed, it would be no
exaggeration to report that, as befits a book of its stature, The
Modern Corporation continues to provide the general intellectual
framework within which much traditional thinking about
corporate governance in both law and business takes place: this is
as true for the status quo’s defenders as well as its detractors. It is
clear, therefore, that any serious effort to appreciate, let alone
transform, the theory and practice of contemporary corporate
governance must pay close and critical attention to The Modern
Corporation.
Recent events in the corporate world have underlined the urgency
of attending to the conceptual foundations of present and future
practice. This is not only because of the scandals and calamities
which have occurred, but also because of the enacted reforms’
relative failure to address the deeper sources of the crisis which
face corporate governance: the causes and the reputed cure are part
of the same informing paradigm.3 Although theoretical posturing
is considered indulgent by the tough-minded sensibilities of
corporate actors, the current practice of corporate governance is in
thrall to a very partial cluster of theoretical premises: “practical
men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any
intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct
economist.”4 Although Berle and Means’ work was intended to

3

Some commentators, of course, maintain that those reforms went too far. See,
for example, Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of
Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1522 at 1529 (2006).
4

JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT,
INTEREST AND MONEY ch.24 (1936). He went on to conclude that “madmen
in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some
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redirect the governance of corporate affairs away from furthering
private cupidity and towards advancing public policy, their
enslaving insights have done more harm than good; they have
tended to reinforce the primacy of private cupidity or, perhaps
more accurately, allowed subsequent theorists to prefer the
pursuit of private cupidity by equating it with the development of
public policy. This is not only unfortunate, but also unnecessary.
Although Berle and Means’ The Modern Corporation forms the
bedrock of the prevailing paradigm in corporate law and
governance, it also contains some very suggestive materials from
which to construct an alternative and more democratic way of
proceeding which actually subverts and transforms the established
model. In this essay, therefore, I want to celebrate The Modern
Corporation, but also to lament the enduring influence of its
received understanding on corporate law scholarship and practice.
If Berle and Means are to avoid becoming ‘defunct’ and remain
relevant to contemporary ideas and practice, it must be more as a
conceptual corrective and less as a traditional prop.

I. 1932 AND ALL THAT
Although Berle and Means’ work had a prescient quality to it, The
Modern Corporation was very much a product of the 1920s. The
first quarter of the Twentieth Century had witnessed a massive
and rapid surge in America’s capital economy. Along with this rise
in economic development and prosperity, there was a shift in
production from small businesses to huge conglomerates; the
accumulation of vast fortunes and the concentration of corporate
power in elite hands were hallmarks of the period. However,
culminating in the stock market crash of 1929 and the Great
Depression, this era of unfettered capitalism was beginning to

academic scribbler of a few years back. I am sure that the power of vested
interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of
ideas. Sooner or later, it is ideas, not vested interests, which are dangerous for
good or evil.”
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collapse under its own burgeoning weight. By the late 1920s, the
juggernaut of corporate organisation was being more closely
scrutinised and its pervasive influence challenged. In what began
as a research project for the Social Science Research Council of
America, Columbia law professor Adolph A. Berle, Jr. sought out
an economist with a statistical bent to work with so as to produce
a more empirical and technical understanding of corporate
development: he was paired up with Gardiner C. Means. Their
unusual collaboration sought to appreciate the corporation as a
social institution as well as an economic organisation. This huge
undertaking was projected to be “the work of a lifetime” and The
Modern Corporation was to be the opening volume “intended
primarily to break ground on the relation which corporations bear
to property.”5 As such, it was meant to be the first and not the last
word on the corporation as a human institution.
Mean’s extensive mapping of the contemporary corporate terrain
was novel and revealing. In an examination of the 200 largest nonfinancial corporations in 1929, he found that in only 11% of the
firms did the largest owner hold a majority of the firm’s shares.
Further, establishing ownership of 20% of the stock as a threshold
minimum for control, it was discovered that 44% of those firms
had no individual who owned that much of the stock. These 88
firms which were classified as management-controlled also
managed to account for 58% of the total assets held among the top
200 corporations. As analysed by both Berle and Means, the upshot
of these statistical insights was that there were two significant and

5

Preface (1932) in ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR. AND GARDINER C. MEANS, THE
MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY liii (Rev. ed. 1968)
(hereinafter all page references are in parenthesis in the text). For two very
different approaches to the history of the modern corporation, see JOHN
MICKLETHWAIT AND ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE COMPANY: A
SHORT HISTORY OF A REVOLUTIONARY IDEA (2003) and JOEL BAKAN,
THE CORPORATION: THE PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF PROFIT AND
POWER (2004).
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pressing features to be addressed—the growing concentration of
power within a relatively small number of large corporations and
the increasing dispersal of stock ownership resulting in a widening
gulf between share ownership and executive control within those
corporations. While each trend was important in itself, their
combination persuaded Berle and Means that a corporate
revolution had occurred and that a new frame of reference was
required in order to appreciate it fully and deal with its legal and
social ramifications. However, although the fact of growing
corporate power provided the informing backdrop, the major
thrust of their report was the struggle to come to terms with the
separation of ownership and control. Indeed, this characterization
of the challenge became “the master problem for research” in
corporate law.6 The growing concentration of corporate power was
more a contextual concern than a central problematic, presumably
to be explored more fully and directly in a later, but never realised
volume.
In examining the organisational implications of the historical shift
from family-owned firms to large widely-held corporations in
which there was separation of ownership and control, Berle and
Means continued, as they refined, a traditional view on corporate
governance. They insisted quite straightforwardly that
corporations ought to be run by the management whose powers
were to be held in trust for stockholders as the sole beneficiaries of
the corporate enterprise. As the separation between share
ownership and managerial control was becoming increasingly
wide, they worried about “the concentration of economic power”
creating “empires” which permit “a new form of absolutism” to
be exercised by “the new princes” and “economic autocrats” of
controlling management (116). In an arresting phrase, they noted
that “a Machiavelli writing today would have very little interest

6

Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV.
923 at 923 (1984).
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in princes, and every interest in the Standard Oil Company of
7
Indiana.” Indeed, they were so concerned about the power of
management that they compare the board of directors to “a
communist committee of commissars” and cast the director as
someone who “more nearly resembles the communist on mode of
thought than he does the protagonist of private property” (245). In
combating such disturbing consequences of the shift in corporate
holdings, Berle and Means maintained that the primary role of
corporate law was to ensure that “all powers granted to a
corporation or the management of a corporation, or to any group
within the corporation, ... are necessarily and at all times
exercisable only for the ratable benefit of all the shareholders”
(220). Because it is the liquidity of their property which most
concerns shareholders, not their involvement in the corporation’s
management, corporate law could rightly arrogate to itself the task
of acting as general overseers of management and subscribe to the
commitment that “a corporation should be run for the benefit of
its owners, the stockholders” (293).
For Berle and Means, therefore, the task for corporate law was to
work out how best to shape corporate law so that it could respond
effectively and efficiently to the intricate and operational
consequences of the divide between diffuse owners and selfserving managers. Put more bluntly, their main focus was upon
ensuring that managers do not ignore the absentee owners and line
their own pockets at the expense of the shareholders. Although
retaining a continuing, if partial, faith in the market as a means to
discipline management and to protect shareholders’ expectations,
they pinned their reform hopes on judicial intervention to
discipline managers in the name of shareholder confidence. With
varying degrees of success, this was to be achieved by mandating

7

A.A. Berle, Jr. and Gardiner C. Means, Corporations and the Public Investor,
20 AM. ECON. REV. 54 at 71 (1930). For an excellent biographical account, see
JORDAN A. SCHWARZ, LIBERAL: ADOLF A. BERLE AND THE VISION OF
AN AMERICAN ERA (1987).
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the primacy of shareholder voting in all important corporate
decisions and the imposition of fiduciary duties on management
(i.e., demanding that managers place the corporation’s interests
ahead of their own). In effect, they gambled on the willingness and
suitability of courts to fashion and police a series of strict and
equitable obligations such that “corporation law becomes in
substance a branch of the law of trusts” (242).
However, it is Berle and Means’ framing of the ownership/control
problem as the central dynamic of corporate law and organisation
that is the main legacy of The Modern Corporation.
Notwithstanding the almost universal acceptance in the ensuing
75 years of the accuracy of their diagnosis of the ills that afflict
corporate governance, agreement with their descriptive
observations has not been matched by implementation of their
prescriptive recommendations. While their mode of proceeding
has had some measure of influence, it has not carried the day; they
are something of “a policy relic.”8 Its incorporation into corporate
law has been half-hearted at best and its capacity to restrain
corporate malfeasance has clearly been lacking in practical effect.

8

William W. Bratton, Berle and Means Reconsidered At the Century’s Turn, 26
J. CORP. L. 737 at 739 (2001). Berle and Means’ concerns about the
owners/managers divide was echoed by critics of the democratic process’s
operation more generally. See JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM,
SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (1942) and SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET,
Introduction in ROBERT MICHELS, POLITICAL PARTIES 15-39 (1962).
However, not all commentators saw the disjuncture as problematic, but viewed
the greater dispersal of capital as a harbinger of ‘people’s capitalism’ and greater
democracy. See Carl Kaysen, The Social Significance of the Modern
Corporation, 47 AM. ECON. REV. 311 (1957). See generally Mark Mizruchi,
Berle and Means Revisited: the Governance and Power of Large U.S.
Corporations, 33 THEORY AND SOCIETY 579 (2004). For a very different
account of corporate history and politics, see Dalia Tsuk, Corporations Without
Labor: The Politics of Progressive Corporate Law, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1861
(2003). She notes that “by focusing on entrepreneurs and investors, they helped
legitimize a conception of value or wealth that was detached from work and
labor.” Id. at 1868.
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More recently, commentators have turned to the market by way of
possible take-overs and performance-based compensation as
further modes of discipline such that inefficient managers would
be replaced by profit-seeking shareholders.
In large part, the relative failure of Berle and Means’ reform
proposals is because they could not or would not move beyond the
‘private property’ logic of the traditional paradigm; profit
maximization and the protection of shareholders’ ownership
entitlements were still the order of the day. Their support for
governmental and judicial intervention was premised on the
limiting premise that these official agencies would act as public
surrogates for private shareholders’ control. In anointing managers
as the “princes of industry” (4) and recommending that they must
serve the community as a whole by ordering their affairs “on the
basis of public policy rather than private cupidity” (313), there was
the distinct whiff of noblesse oblige around even relatively liberal
boardrooms in matters of corporate governance. Indeed, with their
the commitment to the idea that shareholders are ‘the owners of
the corporation’, Berle and Means offer a lament for the lost
‘active’ shareholder who is left with “a mere symbol of
ownership” (65). After all, the full title of their book is The
Modern Corporation and Private Property. For them, a private
property regime provides the best incentive to ensure that property
is used efficiently in the sense that “the quest for profits will spur
the owner of industrial property to its effective use” (9).
Accordingly, the central thrust of Berle and Means’ reform
proposals was to close the gap between owners and management
as much as the legal imposition of equitable duties can do so as to
emulate or approximate the ideal situation of owner-managers.
Their’s was a less of a break with the tradition of ‘shareholder
primacy’ and more of a continuance of it. There may well have
been a ‘corporate revolution’ by 1932, but Berle and Means were
far from revolutionary in their response.
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II. CHRONICLE OF AN END FORETOLD
Much has changed since 1932 in the world of capitalist economies
and corporate organisation. If the forces of ‘concentration’ and
‘separation’ were in play in Berle and Mean’s day, they have been
supplemented by others and become even more powerful and
relentless today—institutional investors, take-overs and mergers,
financial entrepreneurship, and the like. Yet, if Henry Hansmann
and Reinier Kraakman are to be believed, the last few years have
witnessed ‘the end of corporate history’. Echoing the apocalyptic
pronouncements of Francis Fukuyama from a decade earlier, they
declaimed in 2001 that “the basic law of corporate governance—
indeed, most of corporate law—has achieved a high degree of ...
continuing convergence toward a single, standard model ... [and]
there is no longer any serious competitor to the view that
corporate law should principally strive to increase long-term
shareholder value.”9 This seemed wishful thinking on the part of
Hansmann and Kraakman; their reasoned analysis was leavened by
ideological advocacy. At best, it can be reported that the
mainstream of corporate lawyers and commentators have settled

9

Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate
Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439 (2001). No mention is made of Francis Fukuyama who
(in)famously argued that the world had beaten a path to American liberal
democracy on the unfolding carpet of a Universal History whose woof and warp
comprise the motifs of political individualism and economic privatism. While it
is incompletely implemented and capable of further refinement, the ideal of
liberal democracy marks the final end of History: “the modern liberal
democratic world ... is free of contradictions” and “at the end of history, there
are no serious ideological competitors left to liberal democracy.” F.
FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN 48 (1992). For a
powerful critique of this viewpoint, see J. DERRIDA, SPECTERS OF MARX:
THE STATE OF THE DEBT, THE WORK OF MOURNING, AND THE NEW
INTERNATIONAL 56, 69 and 78 (P. Kamuf trans. 1994). Even Fukuyama
himself has had serious second thoughts about his original ‘end of history’
thesis. See AMERICA AT THE CROSSROADS: DEMOCRACY, POWER, AND
THE NEO-CONSERVATIVE LEGACY (2006).
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upon ‘shareholder primacy’ as the preferred normative goal. This is
less because it has achieved an objective and universal status, but
more because few are prepared or have sufficient incentive to
resist the economic and political clout of those championing its
contemporary hegemony. It may well be a descriptive fact that
“governance practice is largely a matter of private ordering”,10 but
that does not mean that it should be accepted as a prescriptive
recommendation. Yet, even in the few years since 2001, events in
the corporate world have not only confounded Hansmann and
Kraakman’s optimism, but have highlighted how fragile and
defective the reliance on ‘shareholder primacy’ has become.
Despite these end-of-history prognostications, the fact remains
that Berle and Means’ account of the problem to be solved still
informs most corporate law thinking. Almost all scholars and
commentators are still in the grip of a traditional mind-set in
which the interests of shareholders are paramount: ‘shareholder
primacy’ remains the guiding light of corporate law and
scholarship. However, what has changed over the past 75 years is
that there have been varied and umpteen efforts to explain and
rationalize this informing mandate so that it can have the largest
possible claim to normative legitimacy. Along with a continuing
reliance on the ‘private property’ rationale, there are three other

10

Id. at 455. For a more interesting spin on the ‘historical progress’ of corporate
law scholarship, see Brain Cheffins, The Trajectory of (Corporate Law)
Scholarship, 63 CAMB. L.J. 456 (2004). While there are strong pressures towards
convergence, the history and political economy of comparative corporate
governance strongly suggests that there is no particular magic to any particular
mode of corporate organisation and structure. Advanced economies have
managed to develop and grow by reliance on a variety of systems of corporate
governance; there is no one size that fits all or, as importantly, no one size that
necessarily fits best. See Ronald Dore, William Lazonick, Mary O’Sullivan,
Varieties of Capitalism in The Twentieth Century, 15 OXFORD REV. ECON.
POLICY 102 (1999).
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dominant arguments relied on by contemporary theorists to
explain and support the continued reliance on ‘shareholder
primacy’ as the preferred rationale for corporate law and
governance; they are ‘market discipline’, ‘social wealth’, and
‘shareholder democracy’. Each of them is deeply flawed and
unconvincing; there has been much heat, but little light.

A. PROPERTY OWNERSHIP
The defence of ‘shareholder primacy’ which runs most directly
from Berle and Means’ ideas is the claim that those who own the
corporation are entitled to have the corporation operate in their
interests and receive any resulting profits. While this still has its
supporters, it has lost much of its argumentative appeal.11 The
‘private property’ rationale misconstrues both the particular
import of owning shares in a corporation and the general
consequences of property ownership. While there can be little
doubt that shareholders have property rights over shares which
can traditionally be treated as ownership, it does mean not that
they, therefore, have similar ownership rights over the
corporation. For instance, the fact that I buy a lottery ticket does
not mean that I own part of the lottery corporation. While I do
own the lottery ticket and have certain traditional property rights
which accompany that (e.g., to destroy it or give it to someone
else), it does not mean that my relation to the lottery corporation

11

See Symposium, Corporations and Private Property, 26 J. L. & ECON. 235
(1983). For a sampling of the theorists who champion ‘shareholder primacy’, see
Jonathon Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making
Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, (1991)
21 STETSON L. REV. 23 ; Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder
Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423
(1993); Mark Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial
Organization, (2001) U. PA. L. REV. 2063; W. Allen, J. Jacobs and L. Strine, The
Great Takeover Debate : A Mediation on Bridging the Conceptual Divide, (2002)
69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1067 at 1075; and Lucian Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing
Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833 (2005).
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is one of owner. While shareholders have various rights of
‘ownership’ (i.e., to sell stock, vote proxies, sue directors, receive
certain information, get residual pay-outs from corporation’s
liquidation, etc.), it is not convincing to assert that shareholders
own the corporation in the same way that people own their cars or
houses. Moreover, even if it is conceded that shareholders are to be
treated as ‘the owners of the corporation’, it by no means follows
that they are entitled by virtue of that status to have the
corporation run entirely in their sole interests. Whatever property
ownership was originally considered to entail, the claims of
property owners are no longer thought to be or enforced as if they
were unreserved and trumped all other competing claims and
interests: the rights of property owners are fundamental, but not
absolute.12
The ‘private property’ argument tends to beg the very question
which it is intended to answer. In a democracy, private property
has its important place, but it is not the foundational source of all
other rights and no longer, if it ever was, the right against which
all other claims are to be measured. Even when it comes to
owning real property (e.g., a house or land) or personal property
(e.g., cars or books), there is no entitlement that the owners’
interests and desires will always be given precedence over others’
interests; there are a whole host of codes, regulations, rules and
conventions which curtail the freedom and entitlements of
owners. Indeed, corporate law itself is chock full of examples
which contradict the stark idea that shareholders ‘own’ the
corporation—shareholders can be restricted as to whom they sell

12

S. BOWLES AND H. GINTIS, DEMOCRACY AND CAPITALISM:
PROPERTY, COMMUNITY, AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF MODERN
SOCIAL THOUGHT xi (1987). (It is entirely puzzling why “the rights of
ownership prevail over the rights of democratic citizenry in determining who is
to manage the affairs of a business enterprise whose policies might directly
affect as many as half a million employees, and whose choice of product,
location, and technology touches entire communities and beyond.”)
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their shares, how they vote for management, when they must offer
to buy others’ shares, etc. Furthermore, in an economy of
relatively diffuse shareholding, many shareholders are decidedly
passive by preference and have no interest in being involved in the
management of the corporations in which they invest; the selfimage of the average investor is not one of corporate owner.
Accordingly, as in almost all other areas of law, therefore,
corporate shareholding does not comprise a black-and-white set of
fixed entitlements, but is a very colourful, highly-shaded and
dynamic process. It is now accepted that property ownership is a
matter of social calculation in which individual interests are
13
measured with and against other people’s interests. As the state
creates and gives legal identity to corporations, it is for the state or
the public to determine who gets ownership over it and what that
ownership entails. As such, the ownership of a share will not
convey any necessary rights on its owner nor will it necessarily
amount to ownership of the corporation from which the shares
arise. As with all property ownership, shareholding will consist of
a bundle of rights whose content and extent will not be a natural
given, but will vary over time and across contexts.

B. MARKET DISCIPLINE
The most sweeping defence of ‘shareholder primacy’ comes from
economics-inspired scholars. The world of corporate governance is
considered to be an informal institutional venue for self-interested
and motivated entrepreneurs to enter a series of consensual deals
to advance their own private economic interests. Although the
market is far from being ideal or even optimal in its operations, it
is touted as the preferred or least-worst alternative through which
to co-ordinate productive endeavours and meet the mixed needs of
its participants. From such a standpoint, the public regulation of

13

J. Waldron, Property Law in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
AND LEGAL THEORY 7 (D. Patterson ed. 1999) and THE RIGHT TO
PROPERTY (1986).
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corporate governance is considered to be merely facilitative rather
than directive. Corporate actors are to be left to exercise their
private discretion in determining what is best for particular
corporations and, by virtue of that, the public interest: the market
will fill the gaps and exact a penalty on the deviant few who
engage in dubious activities and unreasonable practices.14 This
competitive market behaviour is supposed to solve the separation
of ownership and control by a variety of disciplinary devices—
minimizing agency costs (i.e., keeping managers in line with
shareholder interests), containing the ever-present threat of takeovers, responding to competition among firms for successful
managers, monitoring share prices in the stock market, etc.
Corporate law clearly favours the interests of shareholders over
others because shareholders are more vulnerable as they are less
able to find alternative outlets in the market for their services;
they risk all their equity in the corporation’s ventures and
therefore are entitled to greater protection by being beneficiaries of
the directors’ fiduciary duty over the fate of the corporation.
However, the confidence placed in the capacity of market forces to
fulfill these onerous responsibilities seems extravagant and
entirely suspect. The ‘great tragedy’ of economics, like so many
other academic disciplines, is that it is one more beautiful theory
brought to its knees by ugly facts—it is reductionist in its
insistence in viewing all social conduct in terms of market
behaviour; it manages, by giving everything a monetary value, to
overvalue and undervalue much of human interaction; its leading
concepts (voluntariness, transaction costs, etc.) are theoretically
vague and practically indeterminate; it is ethically bankrupt in
that it takes all personal preferences at face value and refuses to
distinguish among them; it is self-serving in that it treats all

14

F. EASTERBROOK AND D. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC OF CORPORATE
LAW 34 (1991). The ‘nexus of contracts’ idea is attributable to M. Jensen and W.
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
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personal preferences as independent of the social or market system
in which they are generated and satisfied; it ignores the distinction
between willingness to pay and ability to pay; and it celebrates
individual autonomy over communal attachment.15
Any plausibility that the market can operate as a disciplinary
technique through which to advance the larger public good is
confounded by the sheer size and influence of today’s corporations.
These massive institutions begin to serve their own interests at
the expense of everyone else’s and distort rather than personify the
entrepreneurial spirit of a market economy. Even Berle and Means
accepted this, although they were not prepared to act fully upon
16
it. Accordingly, although many scholars preach the gospel of free
markets, the cruel irony is that corporations are one of the greatest
threat to the operation of free markets; competition is attenuated
and limited to a few large players. As such, corporations have
become super-citizens with enormous powers and influence that
rival those of the state and the latter-day church, but with much
less popular legitimacy and social accountability. Rather than be
the justificatory underwriter of corporate institutions and
enterprise, the validating operation of today’s market is effectively
hobbled by the continuing involvement of today’s megacorporations.

SOCIAL BENEFIT
A third justification for ‘shareholder primacy’ is that it is the best
way to ensure that corporate operations and profits work to the
benefit of everyone in society: it is a ‘on a rising tide, all boats will
rise’ defence. Although it might appear paradoxical, it is argued
that, even though “ interests of shareholders deserve no greater
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Robert Ashford, The Socio-Economic Foundation of Corporate Law and
Corporate Social Responsibility, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1187 at 1198 (2002).
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weight in this social calculus than do the interests of any other
members of society, there is “as a consequence of both logic and
experience, ... convergence on a consensus that the best means to
this end ... is to make corporate managers strongly accountable to
shareholder interests and, at least in direct terms, only to those
interests.”17 In short, it is contended that such that the more
wealth generated in a society, the better off or more satisfied the
whole of society will be. By holding corporate powers in trust for
shareholders, it will be the same as holding corporate powers in
trust for the entire community: any efforts (and this is
proportionately true for the efforts of corporations) which
contribute to the increased wealth of a society are to be applauded.
In short, maximizing profits and increasing share prices will not
only benefit everyone, but corporate profit-making and social
service, far from being at odds with each other, can be understood
as mutually-reinforcing aspects of the same enterprise.
Despite its ingenious nature, this ‘rising tide’ defence of the
desirability of prioritizing the pursuit of corporate profits in the
social scheme of things is as unconvincing on second look as it is
on first glance: it is unsupported by ‘logic’ and no evidence of
‘experience’ is offered. There is surely no reason to accept at face
value that, if a corporation declares profits of $1 million, social
wealth is increased whether that profit is all distributed to one
person, shared among the shareholders at large, spread among the
various stakeholders, or distributed evenly among society.
Economic growth will not in itself ensure that a society’s
economic health, let alone its broader democratic or social health,
is rude or improving. Indeed, many small boats are sinking or
capsizing in this economic flow; their ability to stay afloat, let
alone make progress, might well be in real danger. Accordingly,
while a society’s overall economic growth is important and telling,

17

Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate
Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439 at 440 (2001).
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it is not the sole or most important indicator of a society’s general
condition and improvement. That being the case, there is no selfevident reason to accept that an increase in its Gross Domestic
Product is, without more, a consistent or convincing indication
that a society is better off.18 Indeed, an increasing GDP may
actually exacerbate social divisions. While an increase might
usually be better than a decrease, the circumstances of the
increase or decrease and the distribution of those gains or losses
will need to be measured against a broader and less exclusively
economic standard. If some smaller or less sturdy boats sink before
the increasing tide, then that is the price of progress. But this
response seems crass, at best, because it is difficult to take
satisfaction in society’s overall increased wealth if there are still
people who live in relative poverty and destitution.

D. SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY
The final rationale for ‘shareholder primacy’ is that it actually
facilitates the achievement of democratic control over corporate
activities and governance. The basic assertion is that, whatever
the historical record suggests, the present distribution of
shareholding is so diffuse and extensive that large corporations are
actually controlled by society at large: more Americans own stock
today than ever before. After all, the United States has one of the
most widely-held corporate economies in the world with only
about 20% of corporations being owned or controlled by a single
19
shareholder. This developing trend is considered to have been
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BRANKO MILANOVIC, WORLDS APART: MEASURING
INTERNATIONAL AND GLOBAL INEQUALITY (2005). For instance, the
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FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2000).
19

See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer,
Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471 (1999).

18

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 03 NO. 01

reinforced by the increasing role of institutional shareholders, like
mutual funds and pension funds, which enable ordinary investors
to participate in corporate affairs and exert their aggregated
influence in a more effective manner. Indeed, some have
commentators have gone so far as to suggest that plutocratic rule
is at an end and that the age of “pension fund socialism’ is now
upon us.20
However, while these claims have some statistical credibility,
their deeper significance is exaggerated. First, although more
Americans hold more stocks than ever before, their distribution is
heavily skewed—the bottom three-quarters of households own
less than 15% of all stock, barely one-third hold more than $ 5,000
21
in stock, and almost a half own no stock at all. This is very soft
ground on which to support the claim that ‘shareholder

20

PETER F. DRUCKER, THE UNSEEN REVOLUTION: HOW PENSION
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democracy’ is alive and well. Not only does the unequal
distribution of share-ownership fatally impair such claims, but the
fact that most of these investors remain passive does little to
bolster the claim. Indeed, the incidence of institutional
investment has actually exacerbated the divide between
ownership and control. Even greater power is concentrated in a
small cadre of investing professionals who have enormous control
over the market and seem intent on exercising it in order to
aligning themselves closer to management so as to obtain further
business and advance their own interests. For instance, a recent
study reveals that mutual funds have a definite tendency to back
executive-pay proposals and to oppose shareholder attempts to
rein in such excesses: mutual funds support executive plans over
shareholder opposition in almost 3 out of 4 instances.22
Accordingly, while ensuring a more robust check on corporate
management’s self-serving tendencies is not unimportant, it does
not address the broader concerns of corporate governance in a
democratic society. Not surprisingly, the advancement of private
interests has been the primary goal of institutional investors; the
public interest has taken a distinct second place or has been
reduced to much the same as the aggregate maximization of
private interest. There is, at best, a faux-democracy at work in
contemporary corporate governance.

22

American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO
and The Corporate Library, Enablers of Excess: Mutual Funds and The Overpaid
American CEO (March 2006).

20

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 03 NO. 01

III. TOWARDS A NEW AGE
If there is to be an end to corporate history, it is not the one that
Hansmann and Kraakman reported or predicted. To paraphrase
Winston Churchill, the first decade of the Twenty-First Century is
not the end of corporate history, but it might well be the
beginning of the end of one phase of corporate history and the
beginning of another.23 Although we have entered the third
millennium, society’s most important and influential institution
remains decidedly Victorian, if not occasionally feudal, in its
orientation and organisation. A small and unrepresentative elite of
controlling shareholders, directors and management effect a
command-and-control regimen over the lives and fates of
countless people. Yet, there are now some encouraging indications
that there is a nascent shift in public opinion and forbearance. Not
only are people beginning to lose patience with corporations, but
there are also some emerging efforts to rein in their power. It is
important to seize this moment of institutional disaffection and
turn it to greater democratic and transformative effect. If there is a
crisis, it is as much one of political will as it is of normative
decrepitude. As the Italian philosopher Antonio Gramsci put it,
“the crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and
the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of
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Winston Churchill, Speech at the Lord Mayor’s Luncheon, Mansion House,
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morbid symptoms appears.”24 Indeed, the past few years have
witnessed ‘a great variety of morbid symptoms’ in regard to
corporate governance.
The Enron saga and particularly the institutional response to it are
probably most illustrative of this pathological condition. Indeed,
the beleaguered company’s accounting scandals and the legislative
response by way of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) are both
decidedly derivative of and trapped within the paradigm of
shareholder primacy; they present an indictment of the whole
conceptual basis for corporate governance. As a reasonably stern
response to shaken investor confidence in financial performance,
SOX contains a series of measures intended to enhance corporate
responsibility, improve financial disclosure and combat corporate
and accounting fraud. To ensure more reliable processes of control,
disclosure and auditing of financial results, rules are directed to
improving the efficiency of audit committees, the independence of
outside auditors, the implementation of internal procedures, and
the like. In particular, senior executives of large publicly-traded
corporations are required to validate the legitimacy of their
performance reports by signing-off on them. Most of these
measures are mandatory in nature and impose monetary and
criminal penalties for violations, although the provisions about
adopting a code of ethics for the CEO and senior financial officers
only require that corporations disclose whether or not they have
such codes and, if not, why not. From within the shareholdercentred traditional paradigm, SOX is a relatively robust initiative
and, as long as its rigorously enforced, will have some important
and beneficial effects.
Yet, while the legislative reforms might or might not improve
auditing and budgetary controls, there was a singular failure on the
part of regulators to appreciate that it was the single-minded focus
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on maximizing shareholder-value that was at the heart of the
problem. The Act is premised on the idea that the whole Enron
debacle was attributable to management’s conflicts of interest
which resulted from a lack of supervision by the board of
directors.25 Consequently, the remedy was to be found in ensuring
that executive behaviour was brought back into line with and
disciplined by greater solicitude for the interests of shareholders
through a more independent board of directors and external
auditors. However, there is ample evidence that it was the singleminded and irresponsible efforts by the management and board to
inflate and maintain share prices and stock values that fueled the
corporation’s demise. A continuing attachment to shareholder
26
primacy was as much the problem as the solution. Until that
underlying commitment is confronted and met, there will be little
progress in moving forward and avoiding further Enron-like
debacles. While it might be going too far to suggest that traditional
models of corporate governance are priming large corporations to
become accidents waiting to happen, it is entirely appropriate to
recommend that there will be little progress in combating Enronlike failures until there is a shift away from the shareholderprimacy ideology which continues to dominate the theory and
practice of corporate governance.

25

Berle and Means’ The Modern Corporation made no real distinction between
board and management (196) and, therefore, paid little attention to the power
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Accordingly, after a run of almost 150 years, the basic model for
corporate regulation is in need of serious revision. The maladies
that afflict corporate governance are no longer capable of being
fixed by strong doses of reformist medicine. The time has come to
effect a complete re-thinking of our fundamental theories about
and expectations of corporations in modern Canadian society. As
in mid-Nineteenth Century England, it is now imperative to bring
about a massive transformation in the structure, organisation and
outlook of large corporations. Up to the 1860s, there was the First
Age of corporations in which they began life as state-sponsored
enterprises to support the schemes and ambitions of fledgling
nation-states in commerce and colonization. Between the 1860s
and today, there has been the Second Age of corporations as
private-controlled agencies for wealth accumulation and
technological innovation. Giving birth to robber-barons, corporate
raiders and dot.com billionaires, private corporations have become
more global and only a little less exploitative in their operations as
the state-directed agencies of old. There is now the need and, as
importantly, the possibility for the emergence of a new paradigm
for the corporation. The move away from a private conception of
corporate life to a more public vision of corporations need most
decidedly not be a misconceived return to the pre-1860
understanding of corporations as delegated centres of state power.
The new age of corporations must be one in which these vital
organisations are treated as vibrant and democracy-enhancing
vehicles for public and private benefit. Within such a newlyemerging sensibility and milieu, the power and prestige of
corporations can be harnessed to the realisation of a more
democratic society generally. Indeed, precisely because
corporations are so pervasive and so potent in their impact on
most people’s daily lives, they offer a vital site at which to begin
this paradigmatic overhaul. And the neglected sub-theme of Berle
and Means’ Modern Corporation is an excellent place to begin that
important endeavour.

24
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IV. BACK TO THE FUTURE
It seems to be the fate of almost all canonical texts that they not
only become more cited than read, but that they are affixed with
one received and uncontroversial meaning. Berle and Means’
classic monograph is wonderful proof of that tendency. If the great
bulk of secondary literature is to be believed, The Modern
Corporation comprises a series of secondary motifs around a
primary theme—the need to bridge the gap between owners and
management as much as the legal imposition of equitable duties
can do so as to approximate the ideal situation of owner-managers.
Yet, because a particular text has been accepted into the legal
canon does not mean that the light it casts is clear or certain.
Indeed, as with texts that have received canonical status in
literature or precedents as part of the doctrinal canon, the meaning
and instruction of legal texts often remain much richer and more
contested than appreciated or conceded; they do not speak for
themselves, but their re-reading is an occasion for valorized efforts
at hermeneutical retrieval. For some, in law and literature, this
richness and opacity are some of the qualities that recommend a
text as great. In this sense, Shakespeare’s Hamlet and the Supreme
Court’s Roe are great not only because of their profundity, but also
because of their profligacy.27 They have stood the test of time
because of their richness and contestability, not in spite of them.
Sadly, Berle and Means’ Modern Corporation has suffered a more
orthodox fate.

A. A RE-VISION
Nevertheless, The Modern Corporation is not so easily pigeonholed and lends itself to convincing and suggestive alternative

27
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readings. Although it has been appropriated by mainstream
corporate law academics to invoke the ‘separation of ownership
and control’ thesis to advocate stronger shareholder rights, the
text’s “analysis was a gun on a rotating platform that could be
pointed in more than one direction.”28 Indeed, The Modern
Corporation and Private Property is a profoundly challenging, yet
schizophrenic book. It is, in large and traditionally-understood
part, a nostalgic lament for a lost and traditional age of simple
economic arrangements; this rendering has become the
mainstream legacy of Berle and Means. But, in smaller and
neglected part, it is also a romantic yearning for a new and
revolutionary vision of social organisation. Once it is appreciated
that “[s]ize alone tends to give these giant corporations a social
significance not attached to the smaller units of private
enterprise,” it is not so large a step to conclude that “new
responsibilities towards the owners, the workers, the consumers,
and the State thus rest upon the shoulders of those in control” (7).
This alternative and more capacious reading comes alive when
Berle and Means’ concern with the rise of the corporation as
organisations which have “passed far beyond the realm of private
enterprise ... [and] have become more nearly social institutions”
(46) is placed front and centre ahead of the ownership-and-control
thesis. Indeed, in 1932, they felt able to conclude The Modern
Corporation with a chilling appraisal of American corporate
power. They opined that not only did corporations represent “a
concentration of economic power which can compete on equal
terms with the modern state,” but also that “the modern
corporation may be regarded not simply as one form of social
organisation, but potentially (if not yet actually) as the dominant
institution of the modern world, ... possibly even superseding [the
state]” (313). If that day of ‘actually’ has not yet arrived today, it is
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perilously closer; the march of corporate power has continued
apace. In order to appreciate fully the extent to which corporations
have consolidated and increased their economic sway, it is
necessary to place their operations and performance in a wider
global context. When this is done, the almost unrivalled
dominance of these “non-statist collectivisms”29 in social and
political as well as economic spheres can be grasped.
If corporate sales and national GDPs are treated as interchangeable, corporations comprise about 50% of the world’s 100
largest economies in the world. Of course, American corporations
dominate the global group, with 82 representatives or 41% in the
top 200 corporations: Japanese firms are second, with only 41
representatives in the top 200. General Motors is now bigger than
Denmark; Daimler-Chrysler is bigger than Poland; Royal
Dutch/Shell is bigger than Venezuela; IBM is bigger than
Singapore; and Sony is bigger than Pakistan. Indeed, the top 200
corporations’ combined sales are bigger than the combined
economies of all countries, except for the biggest 10. Also, the top
200 corporations’ sales are growing at a faster rate than overall
global economic activity. However, while the sales of the top 200
corporations are the equivalent of 27.5% of world economic
activity, they employ only 0.78% of the world’s workforce.
Furthermore, although the those corporations’ profits grew 362.4%
in the past 20 years or so, the number of people that they employ
increases by only 14.4%. The economic clout of the top 200
corporations is particularly staggering compared to that of the
poorest segment of the world’s humanity: their combined sales are
18 times the combined annual income of the 1.2 billion people or

29

Berle, Foreword to THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY xvi (E.
Mason ed. 1959).
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24% of the world’s total population living in ‘severe’ poverty
30
(those surviving on less than $1 per day).
Once what Louis Brandeis termed the “curse of bigness” is placed
in contemporary context,31 the concerns of Berle and Means
become even more compelling. They appreciated that, because
“the economic power in the hands of the few persons who control
a giant corporation is a tremendous force which can harm or
benefit a multitude of individuals, affect whole districts, shift the
currents of trade, bring ruin to one community and prosperity to
another,” (46) the people who exercised power over these
burgeoning corporate empires would become the new “princes of
industry” (4) and a new despotism would take hold. As such, it
was essential that this enormous power “shall be subjected to the
same tests of public benefit which have been applied in their turn
to power otherwise located” (310) in modern society. In short,
therefore, if ‘accountability’ is seen as the primary theme of the
book, its concerns and proposals for change take on a very
different emphasis and orientation. The private property owners
became as much a part of the problem as the solution; their
powers and entitlements must be harnessed to and disciplined in
accordance with the public interest. When read in this way (and
almost despite the efforts of the authors themselves), The Modern
Corporation remains a robust and still relevant critique of
corporate governance at the beginning of the Twenty-First
Century. More importantly, it still resonates strongly as a rallying
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call to popularist arms for all those who are committed to making
the large modern corporation a worthy and welcome participant in
the all-important project for democratic empowerment.

B. SECOND THOUGHTS?
In many ways, it was Berle and Means’ own ambivalence about
pursuing the more radical implications of their critique which
hindered efforts to move away from a ‘private property’ regime to a
more fully public re-envisioning of the corporate role and
responsibility. At the end of their celebrated monograph, they
begin to build on the established fact that the modern-day
shareholder has clearly “surrendered a set of definite rights for a
set of indefinite expectations” (244). Indeed, they go so far as to
concede that, with the entrenched separation of ownership and
control, the shareholders’ “relation to [their] wealth” has changed
and that the corporation should be seen as a public entity and “the
logic applicable to that change should itself change” (298). Yet
Berle and Means refused to take the next ‘logical’ step which was
not only to accept the passivity of shareholders, but also to
recognise that the very idea of the shareholder as property owner
was no longer valid or applicable and that reliance on a ‘private
property’ rationale for corporate governance was no longer
compelling or desirable.
Even on its publication in 1932, The Modern Corporation’s focus
on the importance of the disjuncture between ownership and
control did not persuade everyone. Dissenting voices could be
heard, although their force and caution have long since been
ignored. In particular, E. Merrick Dodd Jr. argued that corporate
directors and officers should not be viewed solely as agents of
shareholders, but should also be required to act as stewards for the
interests of others, even if that meant curtailing the proprietary
rights of those shareholders. Indeed, Edwin Dodd went so far as to
suggest that managers might go further and actually consider
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themselves to be “guardians of all the interests which the
corporation affects and not merely servants of its absentee
owners.”32 Berle took up the challenge and responded to Dodd by
arguing that a broad corporate duty to serve society not only
would violate shareholders’ private property rights, but would also
be so vague as to put no meaningful constraint on managers’ use of
corporate assets: “unchecked by present legal balances, a socialeconomic absolutism of corporate administrators, even if
benevolent, might be unsafe.”33 However, by the late 1950s, a
chastened Berle seemed to have at least conceded considerable
ground in his debate with Dodd. While he recognised that
managerial discretion might be viewed as a positive attribute
which could allow managers to act in the interests of society as a
whole,34 Professor Berle insisted that he did not accept that Dodd
was right in any absolute or prescriptive sense: “it is one thing to
agree that this is how social fact and judicial decisions turned out
[but,] ... it is another to admit this was the ‘right’ disposition; I am
not convinced it was.”35
By 1968, in their new and separate prefaces for The Modern
Corporation, Berle and Means had begun to accept many of the
limitations in the thinking that underlay the original edition.
Nevertheless, they were still not fully prepared to abandon their
established ways of thinking. After describing the even greater
level of concentration and lack of genuine competition among
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American corporations, the economist Means contented himself
with simply asking “is the concentration of power in the
management of the large corporations consistent with the
maintenance of a democratic society?” (l). On the other hand, the
law professor Berle stated that, while the nature of the property
rights of shareholders has changed, there is still very much a
property right at work. Although “a new classification has been
superimposed on the old theory” (xxiii) and “the ‘private’ and, still
more, individualized, aspects [of property] will become
increasingly attenuated” (xxvi), there has now been a break-up of
“the package of rights and privileges comprising the old
conception of property” (xxxi). Nevertheless, Berle came back to
the conclusion that , even though there has been a move away
from treating stock as primarily a vehicle for raising capital and
more “a channel for distributing income whose accumulation for
capital purposes is not required” (xxix), the modern corporation
and “property used in production [i.e., shares] must conform to
conceptions of civilisation worked out through democratic process
of American constitutional government” (xxxviii). He was
convinced that the era of private corporations (or, at least, the
understanding of corporations as extensions of private shareholding) was no longer coherent in practice or theory.
However, the time has come to take the obvious steps that Berle
and Means illuminated, but felt unable or unwilling to pursue
themselves. In a compelling conclusion to The Modern
Corporation, they floated the idea of rejecting both a strengthening
of the rights of passive investors and a realpolitik acceptance of
managerial control. Instead, they offered the possibility that,
because existing corporate arrangements had “cleared the way for
the claims of a group far wider than either the owners or the
control [group],” the community could “demand that the modern
corporation serve not [only] the owners or the control [group] but
all society and that the governing principle of corporate
governance should be “the paramount interests of the
community” (312). Indeed, Berle and Means end with a hope that
the separation between ownership and control will result not in a
triumph by one faction over the other, but with the rise of a new
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paradigm of corporate governance; “the law of corporations might
well be considered as a potential constitutional law for the new
economic state.” (313). While they were wrong in believing that
the control of corporations and the balancing of interests might be
effected by “a purely neutral technocracy”, they were on the right
track when they expressed the hope that this might be done “on
the basis of public policy rather than private cupidity” (312-13).
The challenge, therefore, is to move from ‘private cupidity’ to
‘public policy’ while both retaining the best of private initiative
and resisting the worst of a domineering state. This can be
achieved by ushering in a new era of corporate history in which
democracy is the standard and the goal of corporate governance. In
such a vision, corporations might begin to function as a
democratic nexus at which public and private, political and
economic, individual and state, and personal freedom and civic
responsibility meet. Corporations will be less an anomaly in
contemporary democratic terms and more a primary site for the
advancement of democratic politics.
Before proceeding to sketch this democratic alternative, two
preliminary caveats are worth mentioning. As critical as I am of
the narrow scope and shallow substance of the existing model of
corporate governance, none of my critique should be interpreted as
trashing or rejecting those legal rules and doctrines which seek to
control management in the name of some larger set of interests:
no other group gains when managers self-deal. However, in
supporting such disciplinary laws, it does not follow that the effort
to discipline management should be done only on behalf of
shareholders. From a more democratic perspective, profit
maximization will not be eschewed entirely, but will simply no
longer be the exclusive or pre-dominant goal among many other
social ambitions—shareholders will be one kind of constituency
member. Moreover, in recommending a shift away from the
present paradigm, I am not suggesting that the whole idea of
‘private property’ should be abandoned or, as some might propose,
that the ‘means of production’ be put in public hands. I am as
much against an overbearing state as a rampant private sphere. It
is more that democracy should be used as a theory and a practice
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to address the economic and social conditions of people’s lives as
much as their civil and political entitlements; the market must be
made to serve, not control people’s interests. In that, Milton
Friedman is right in one important regard—the effort to extend the
range of institutions and interests to which corporations owe
obligations is a “fundamentally subversive doctrine.”36 However,
while this effort might signal the end of the prevailing governance
arrangements, it might also be the harbinger of a more democratic
society.
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V. FROM CORPOCRACY TO DEMOCRACY
In seeking to nurture and develop suitable forums and settings
that are more local and less hierarchical and are more participatory
and less private, large corporations recommend themselves as
almost ideal locations for enabling people to become full citizens
in their society. They stand squarely between the market and the
government and they exert the kind of power which needs to be
opened up if there is to be any real progress in closing the
democratic gap between the governors and governed. Of course,
such a political enterprise will demand that several crucial
relations and contexts be transformed and reworked—those
between corporations and the state; those inside corporations (i.e.,
shareholders, management and workers); and those between
corporations and general public. Nevertheless, it is only if such a
bold strategy to advance the democratic project is commenced that
any real or meaningful change in the democratic condition
generally and in corporate governance particularly can be
expected. There are risks attached to such a commitment, but
there are greater dangers to maintaining the status quo.

A. A DEMOCRATIC GAMBIT
In the quarter century since Lindblom’s conclusion that “the large
corporation [does not fit] into democratic theory and vision”,37 the
situation has hardly improved. Although the power and influence
of corporate activities has continued to expand and deepen, a
democratically-inspired agenda for corporate governance has lost
much of the plot. Reform efforts remain too reactive, too
piecemeal, too modest, and too trapped within the prevailing
paradigm. In contrast, I want to offer, in the spirit of a reworked
Berle and Means’ approach, an unabashedly and robust democratic
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proposal for corporate law and governance. By understanding
corporations as neither wholly public nor wholly private
institutions, the hope is to move beyond the cramped language of
the public/private and harness the traditional strengths of the
corporate form to the more civic agenda of democracy. By
envisaging and concretizing a democratic form of corporate
organization, it might become possible to cultivate the kind of
hybrid institution for civic interaction, both economic and
political, which will be true to the democratic ambitions of all its
participants.
Despite all the recent and high-profile shenanigans of bad
corporate behaviour, it would be mistaken to place all the critical
focus on them. If any actual progress is to be made in confronting
and improving corporate wrongdoing, it demands more than an
ethical and criminal condemnation of such individual conduct. As
important as that is, identifying and punishing corrupt or greedy
executives whose conduct is castigated by almost everyone both
outside and inside the corporate world is almost the easy part.
What is much more difficult and necessary is to address the larger
organisational structures and culture within which such roguery
arises and persists. What presently passes as ‘good corporate
governance’ is as much of a problem as the instances of bad
corporate behaviour. It might be that, when corporate managers
are doing their job best or, at least, well, they are doing most harm
to society. This perverse state of affairs demands urgent appraisal.
It is only when large corporations are understood and analysed in
the larger setting of democracy that it will be possible to move
forward. Indeed, it is only when corporations are obliged to
become part of, rather remain apart from, democratic society more
broadly that progress will be made. If we want ‘good corporate
citizens’, then we must seek a sea-change in how we think about
corporations, how we constitute them, how we regulate them, and
what we expect of them. To ignore or marginalize such issues is to
renege on the most basic of democratic ambitions.
The fact that large corporations are major players in the political,
economic and social system seems to be indisputable; they
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exercise enormous power over the lives of ordinary people. While
any accumulation of power must be treated with suspicion and
mistrust in a democracy, there is no necessity to consider it
illegitimate by its aggregation fact alone. Power is not the problem
in and of itself, but the basis for its exercise and legitimacy. When
it comes to the pedigree and consequences of corporate power,
there is a considerable burden on its operatives and apologists to
offer a suitable series of justifications; corporate power seems
presumptively undemocratic, if not actually anti-democratic.
Because the goal of shareholder primacy has become “second
nature to politicians,”38 it will be necessary to offer a pragmatic
alternative to the neo-liberal philosophy which has proven so
effective in insulating large corporations from regulation and
regeneration in the public interest. As the line between
government and business has become increasingly blurred,
politicians are persuaded that government’s only legitimate role is
to facilitate business. As one critic pointedly notes, “while the
business of government seems more than ever to be business, the
business of business ... [is] increasingly becoming that of
39
government.”
Despite its many different and innovative efforts, traditional
theorizing has failed to make a persuasive case for how the
modern corporation can be reconciled with the rhetoric and reality
of democratic governance in contemporary society. In particular, a
major source of bewitchment in this process is the conceptual
tendency to insist that there is an almost cast-iron distinction
between public undertakings and private interests. Whereas the
former are considered to be the legitimate domain for democratic
participation, the latter are treated as something aside from that.
In this formalised approach, emphasis is placed on the source and
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pedigree of power rather than its effects and consequences. In a
world of such enormous corporate power and influence, such a
disciplinary device is almost guaranteed to ignore and even
condone extensive abuses of power. It guts the whole
emancipatory dynamic of accountability and makes democracy
safe for the private exercise of corporate power. In short, large
corporations are the favoured offspring of neo-liberalism’s
attachment to the public-private distinction.40

B. BEYOND PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
Yet, when viewed from a thoroughly democratic perspective, the
operations and decision-making of the modern corporation cannot
be immune from public oversight in the public interest. It is the
‘abuse of power’ in substantive and real terms which is the focus
of attention. The formal source of power is secondary to its effects
and deprivations. Reliance on a strict public-private distinction
exacerbates the pernicious effects of privatised corporate power on
people’s lives. Of course, it does not follow that, when understood
as “the dominant institution of the modern world” (313),
corporations are to be treated in the same way as other large-scale
public institutions by having the full panoply of duties and
responsibilities under the administrative or even constitutional
law regime imposed on them by the courts. This is to
misunderstand both the nuanced and pluralistic insights of
democratic governance and the structural and democratic
limitations of judicial review. Although it is important to
appreciate large corporations as remote and bureaucratic
institutions and to emulate the particpatory ambitions of modern
administrative law, it is both unwise and impractical to aggregate
even further power in the courts; their own democratic legitimacy
is sufficiently fragile and contested to caution against an extension

40

See Morton Horowitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U.
PA. L. REV. 1423 (1982).

2007]

PUBLIC POLICY AND PRIVATE CUPIDITY

37

of judicial review’s existing reach.41 Instead, a different and more
substantive set of measures must be introduced which can grapple
more directly and effectively with the substantive and formal
dimensions of what counts as ‘good corporate governance’. If
corporations can be made to function as a democratic nexus at
which public and private, political and economic, individual and
state, and personal freedom and civic responsibility meet, they
will become less an anomaly in contemporary democratic terms
and more a primary site for the advancement of democratic
politics.
At the heart of a democratic compact will be a re-invigoration of
the neglected fact that the corporate form is a distinctly publiccreated institution which is brought into existence by the state
and has certain conditional powers delegated to it by the state. As
constructions and emanations of the state, modern corporations
42
have a distinctly public origin and a decidedly public purpose.
The debate about corporate governance is, therefore, about the
nature and parameters of those public purposes. Once corporations
are understood in this way, it no longer continues to be a question
of whether it is appropriate or reasonable to ask corporate owners
and administrators to pursue the public interest at all. Instead, the
more telling issue is what public interests should the corporation
pursue and how it should go about formulating and
operationalising them. The advancement of private interests will
remain important, but will not exhaust the ‘public interest’. By
availing themselves of the advantages of incorporation, investors
and entrepreneurs are entering into a bargain with the state and
the community—in return for the benefits of pursuing their
private ambitions through the corporate form, people must accept
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the public responsibilities and costs that come with it.
Shareholders and stakeholders would become simply different
kinds of members who would include owners, directors, managers,
workers, customers, suppliers, lenders, neighbours, community,
etc.
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VI. A DEMOCRATIC AGENDA
There will be nothing easy about determining for the purposes of
corporate governance which groups are to classify as members, by
what means their interests are to be ascertained, how to ensure
that those interests are adequately represented, and on what basis
those often competing interests are to be to weighed and balanced.
However, a commitment to democracy demands that such efforts
43
be made. While a variety of strategies lend themselves to this
emancipatory project, I will concentrate on four particular
initiatives—limits on limited liability; a broadening of directors’
fiduciary duties; the increased representativeness of the board; and
the enactment of substantive regulatory standards. While each of
these innovations are not novel in themselves, they will, when
taken together as a package, help to bring about a genuine and
thoroughgoing change in the democratic thrust of corporate
governance.

A. LIMITED LIABILITY
Although the limited liability of corporations is considered to be
one of the main attractions of incorporation as it encourages
investment at less risk and with greater diversification, it has
some severe shortcomings—it tends to re-allocate risk rather than
reduce it; it places this re-allocated risk on those stakeholders (e.g.,
employees, neighbours, etc.) often less able to shoulder it; and it
can encourage riskier behaviour as corporations are excused from
internalizing the full costs of their risky behaviour.44 However, in
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order to make democratic sense of this debate, it is necessary keep
a broader and more encompassing view of corporate activity. After
all, as I have been at pains to emphasise, the whole notion of
‘governance’ implies much more than simply doing profitable
business; it suggests a public and accountable aspect to the
dealings of the corporation which encompasses, but is not only
reducible to private gain and economic profitability. When
understood from a democratic perspective, it is the limits of
limited liability rather than limited liability itself which must be
re-configured.
Under such a democratic conception of corporate governance, it
seems entirely unconvincing to establish an institutional
framework for legal liability which shifts almost all the costs onto
some persons and all the benefits onto different persons. At the
moment, on the one hand, there is management/shareholder
control without responsibility and, on the other hand, there is
stakeholder responsibility without control. This is anathema to
the democrat who is committed to closing, not maintaining the
gap between the powerful and the less powerful. If people claim
the rights of ownership and the authority to govern the
corporation in their own best interests, it seems almost axiomatic
that they should at least bear some responsibility for its actions
and behaviour. That being said, if the shareholder’s lack of
responsibility is to continue to any extent, then there seems no
compelling reason to object to the reduced control of shareholders
or their displaced focus as the corporation’s main concern. From a
democratic perspective, the price of limited liability is the cost of
reduced influence. While there are also other legal mechanisms by
which to reduce negative externalities created by corporate
conduct (i.e., general welfare laws designed to deter corporate
conduct through criminal and civil sanctions), the imposition of

Shareholders as Stakeholders: Changing Metaphors of Corporate Governance,
50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1409 (1993).
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some liability in some circumstances on shareholders seems
45
democratically optimal.
Rather than take an all-or-nothing stance, it is better to provide a
series of initiatives that can be combined to effect the limited and
selective availability of limited liability. Possible legal strategies
for limiting limited liability include narrowing its scope to
contractual risk as opposed to tort liability, introducing pro rata
liability for shareholders,46 lifting the corporate veil more,
imposing selective liability on controlling shareholders, abolishing
limited liability for shareholding corporations, and greater
vicarious liability of directors in certain circumstances.47 Each has
the distinct potential to effect a more acceptable balance of control
and risk; traces of each approach can already be detected in
corporate law. But, when understand as part of an integrated and
democratic approach to corporate governance, they can work
together to provide a more subtle, balanced and measured
solution.
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The available historical and empirical evidence strongly suggests that there
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B. EXTENDED DUTIES
The next step in transforming the modern corporation into a more
democratic and more public-oriented institution is to take
seriously the assertion that the board of directors must exercise
their powers and fulfil their fiduciary duties ‘in the best interests
of the corporation’. In defining which interests best comprise the
corporation, it will be necessary to take a more expansive view
than the limited focus on the interests of one set of stakeholders,
namely the shareholders. Such interests are entirely deserving of
consideration, but they will be only one set of interests to be taken
into the balance and not the exclusive or primary ones. The ghost
48
of Dodge must be exorcized once and for all. The corporation is
an organic entity with multiple and shifting constituents whose
interest will vary over time and in different contexts; no one set of
interests will have their thumb on the governance scales. In
advancing the welfare of the corporation, it will be important to
assess the directors’ performance over an extended time-frame
rather than on a single decision basis; the best interests of the
corporation will not be reducible to a simple formula or set of
fixed interest. This will be a challenging undertaking for directors
and one that will demand a variety of skills and sensitivities.
Traditional critics will be right to point out that such general
obligations will not easily be rendered operational, instilled with
specific substance or given effective teeth; this broad
responsibility can become a shield to justify any action by the
board. As Berle himself observed, “unchecked by present legal
balances,
a
social-economic
absolutism
of
corporate
49
administrators, even if benevolent, might be unsafe.” These are
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reasonable objections, but insufficiently compelling to derail the
whole project.
As things presently stand, the directors must often balance the
competing interests of different shareholders in a constantly
shifting market—Are long-, medium- or short-term interests of the
shareholders to be served? Are directors to concentrate on
increasing production and dividends or managing the share price?
How is equity to be ensured among majority and minority
interests? These are far from easy questions and require
considerable sophisticated judgment on the part of the directors.
Of course, extending the directors’ fiduciary duty to stakeholders
will not lessen that challenge. But it will not move it into a
qualitatively different realm of operational difficulty. There are
already several fiduciary relationships imposed by law (e.g.,
executors) which encompass duties to a class of persons or groups
whose interests might well be far from unitary or readily
compatible. Consequently, while demanding and difficult, the
application of a broader fiduciary duty is certainly not outside the
competence of sophisticated businesspersons. Rather than be an
exceptional duty, the fiduciary responsibility of directors would be
brought in line with the thematic principle that fiduciaries are to
be held “to something stricter than the morals of the marketplace;
... only thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a
level higher than that trodden by the crowd.”50 In the campaign to
democratise the corporation, this seems an essential and welcome
reform.

C. REPRESENTATIVE BOARDS
Corporate duties to stakeholders are an improvement, but they are
not a lasting or substantial solution and their effects will be
muted. Unless there is a change in the composition of those
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entrusted with the power and responsibility to run the
corporation, it will always be what managers or shareholderappointed directors think is in the best interests of the broader
stakeholder community rather than stakeholders being able to
determine that for themselves. After all, democracy is not only
supposed to be for the people, but of the people. No matter how
benign or progressive the decisions made by elite groups may be,
they remain decisions which lack the important imprimatur of
democratic participation: accountability is only a poor second to
participation as a mode of democratic governance. As with other
institutions and agencies charged with advancing the public
interest, there is a compelling need for public participation.
Accordingly, as well as reforming the rules for proxy voting,
strenuous efforts must be made to introduce reforms which will
facilitate involvement by those stakeholder groups whose interests
are directly and substantially at stake in corporate behaviour.
However, because the potential effects of large-scale corporate
activities are truly wide-ranging and often global, this challenge is
beset by practical difficulties. The two main initiatives to date for
dealing with this conundrum are ‘diversified shareholding’ and
‘independent directors’. While they both make important in-roads
into present arrangements, they fall short of any truly democratic
goal. Whereas ‘independent directors’ are themselves appointed by
and are often beholden to the existing shareholder-appointed
board, ‘diversified shareholding’ tends to reinforce the existing
scheme of corporate governance by perpetuating the idea that
financial contribution is the best measure of democratic
participation.51 When employees become shareholders, the real
threat is that they become persuaded to adopt the same purely
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economic mentality to corporate planning and success as today’s
shareholders; they will be more interested in short-term gains in
the secondary stock market than in long-term contributions to the
primary goods-and-services and jobs market.
A more convincing avenue of democratic reform would be to
introduce independence and diversification in a more direct
manner. For instance, it might be possible to divided affected
persons and stakeholders into three main constituencies. Each
constituency would represent and give increased involvement to
different members of the corporate community. The three
constituencies would be the shareholders, the employees, and the
other stakeholders or the public. As regards the shareholder
constituency, all shareholders might have the same entitlements
and responsibilities with no one shareholder being able to exercise
more than 25% of the overall total of votes available to
shareholders. When it came to the employees, all existing and
permanent employees, part-time and full-time as well as
management and rank-and-file, would be eligible to vote for a
fraction of the board: those who stood for election as employeerepresentatives would themselves have to be employees. Finally,
as regards the public constituency (which would include all other
stakeholders, such as creditors, suppliers, customers, local
community, etc.), there might be an attempt to designate a
fraction of the board as ‘general public directors’ whose mandate
would be to represent the public interest as it applies to the
operations of a particular corporation. These directors could be
selected by a fractional vote of the rest of the already-elected board
of shareholder- and employee-representatives from a list of
approved candidates maintained by a public agency which would
have ultimate authority to approve or disapprove such elected
persons as being suitably diverse and pertinent to the specific
52
corporation’s operations. In order to be admitted to this list,
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candidates would have to satisfy the regulatory body that they not
only had general directorial competence, but that they also
appreciated the public role and democratic responsibilities of
corporations.
By establishing such a balanced scheme of membership, certain
important advantages will accrue. Apart from the general
conformity of the proposal to a democratic vision of corporate
governance, the most obvious benefits are twofold. First, even if
individual directors take a very self-regarding stance by pushing
only for the interests of those groups who elected them, they will
still have to persuade others of the more general wisdom of that
stance. It will likely require a more long-term approach to
directorial debate so that priorities and plans will be able to
proceed on a more consensual basis. Also, being exposed to
different perspectives might well loosen the more parochial
concerns of particular directors. Moreover, the active presence of
the ‘public directors’ will oblige other directors to develop and
frame their views in ways which are more conducive to the
promotion of the general public interest. Secondly, because the
board of directors would be under a broad fiduciary duty to
advance the interests of the whole corporation, the considerable
challenge of balancing competing interests and objectives might be
more easily accomplished. By having a more diverse and
representative board, an appreciation of what is in the best
interests of the corporation as a whole will be more informed and
immediate: the various stakeholder communities will have a
direct voice in discussions. This will also help to de-stabilize the
ruling elite which presently has a virtual lock on corporate
decision-making and culture. Accordingly, the odds on making the

STONE, WHERE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE
BEHAVIOUR 152-83 (1975).

2007]

PUBLIC POLICY AND PRIVATE CUPIDITY

47

democratic wager are significantly shortened by the appointment
53
of a more diverse and representative board of directors.

D. SUBSTANTIVE MEASURES
Nevertheless, while such reforms in representation will be
extremely important, they again will not be sufficient in
themselves to implement a democratic system of corporate
governance. The introduction of more stakeholder-representative
boards, greater responsibility for corporate actors and beneficiaries,
and better protections for minority shareholders will be vitally
important. But they will not be enough. If the goal is to ensure
that large corporations act in a more democratically and
responsive manner, it will also be essential to lay down certain
minimum substantive standards against which corporate
performance and behaviour can be judged. Accordingly, there will
need to be a mix-and-match balance between structural reform
and substantive regulation. As traditional scholars insist, it is
naive to believe that asking present corporate officers to act
responsibly for the benefit of stakeholder communities will be
sufficient or that making structural changes without some
accompanying ethical shift will achieve a marked degree of
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The proposal that various stakeholders might have a voice or part in the
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democratic modification.54 In order for there to be genuine change
and transformation in corporate behaviour, it will be necessary for
society as a whole to participate in the continuing responsibility of
determining what is ‘in the public interest’. As public institutions
and government-created ones at that, corporations must at a
minimum be obliged to ensure that they do not act in a way that
is inimical to the public interest. As things presently stand, the
‘public interest’ is too often a by-product of what happens to
advance corporate and private interests at any given time and
place. In a democracy, it is for the public through democratic
institutions and processes to determine what that public interest
is; it is not for corporations either by design or default to
appropriate that task entirely for themselves alone.
As well as improved transparency in corporate transactions and
dealings, it would also be necessary to introduce mandatory
disclosure and reporting on a whole range of economic and social
issues that might include, for example, information on the
products a company produces and the countries in which it does
business; on the corporation’s law compliance structure; on its
domestic labour practices; on its global labour practices and
supplier/vendor standards; on its domestic and global
environmental effects; on corporate charitable contributions,
political contributions, or the effects of using a corporation’s
products on consumer health and safety.55 However, if corporate
governance is to be taken seriously on its own terms, the
enactment and enforcement of such regulations must not be left
only to securities regulators. While the protection of shareholder
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interests is a necessary feature of any advanced economy, it is not
and should not be the only game in town. Of course, it is not
surprising that the authorities persist in treating corporate
governance as largely about the protection of shareholders
interests alone when the informing vision of corporate governance
is so shareholder-centred in orientation, content and enforcement.
Accordingly, under a democratic model of corporate governance, it
will be essential to create and empower a public regulatory body
whose exclusive responsibility is to deal squarely with corporate
governance in its own right and not only as a function of the
protection of shareholder interests. Because the size and power of
large modern corporations has assumed such significance, it is
clear that they warrant their own regulatory body.

E. DEMOCRACY AND CAPITALISM
Finally, in offering this robust critique of contemporary
approaches to corporate law and governance, it bears emphasizing
that my intention has not been to defend the claim that
productivity or profit-making is a bad thing. Nor am I
recommending that all jobs will be forever safe or that the
workers’ and other stakeholders’ interests will always outweigh
those of shareholders. This would be plain silly. There is nothing
wrong with productivity, efficiency, profitability, etc. Indeed, they
are essential values for any modern society to embrace and foster.
But it is the elevation of such values to a cluster of meta-values
against which all social processes and other values must be judged
that is the problem. As both a matter of historical record and as an
issue of public policy, it is mistaken to suggest shareholder-value
maximisation is or ought to be the sole or primary goal of the
business corporation. This would be, as an incredulous critic
notes, “to define the business corporation ... as a kind of shark that
lives off the community rather than as an important agency in the
construction, maintenance, and transformation of our shared
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lives.”56 In particular, there is no sense in thinking about large
corporations as a democratic venue for democratic engagement
between political equals. While a cost-benefit analysis is necessary
and desirable, it ought to be the first step in making any corporate
decision, not the first, last and only consideration. The process of
formulating benefits and entitlements is important in itself under
a democratic theory; an appreciation of the social context within
which individuals exist and thrive is essential.
There is simply no reason to be persuaded that capitalism and
democracy are somehow synonymous.57 Indeed, the link between
capitalism and democracy is weak at best and counter-productive
at worst. If capitalism is to remain, then it must serve rather than
master the interests of democracy. Citizens are entitled to basic
economic protections by virtue of their membership in society and
not only through their efforts at contractual negotiations.
Democrats appreciate that, while everything has a cost, that is not
the sole measure of value: citizens are not only consumers. And
Democracy is not only or best sold in the marketplace. Indeed, as
Amy Chua has noted, “markets concentrate wealth, often
spectacular wealth, in the hands of the market-dominant
minority, while democracy increases the political power of the

56

White, How Should We Talk About Corporations? The Languages of
Economics and of Citizenship, 94 YALE L.J. 1416 at 1419 (1985). See also See
LAWRENCE MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY: AMERICA’S
NEWEST EXPORT (2001).
57

For a sophisticated attempt to portray ‘market economics’ as an (American)
article of faith, see ROBERT NELSON, ECONOMICS AS RELIGION: FROM
SAMUELSON TO CHICAGO AND BEYOND (2001). See also G. SOROS,
OPEN SOCIETY: REFORMING GLOBAL CAPITALISM (2000) and JOHN KAY,
THE TRUTH ABOUT MARKETS: THEIR GENIUS, THEIR LIMITS, THEIR
FOIBLES (2003).

2007]

PUBLIC POLICY AND PRIVATE CUPIDITY

51

impoverished majority.”58 The obvious challenge is to ensure that
politics is played out throughout social life and not merely
confined to areas outside the economic sphere; people are entitled
to participation and accountability in their dealings with and
inside businesses as much as with politicians and governments.
Accordingly, a shift to more democratically-structured
corporations will likely galvanize the democratic instinct
generally. As President Woodrow Wilson famously opined, “the
cure for the ills of democracy is more democracy, not less.”
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VII. CONCLUSION
Recent events in corporate governance have at least opened up a
space to think seriously about how it might be possible to turn the
present system’s failings to transformative effect. Indeed, with
effort and imagination, it might presently be possible to bring to
an end the age of the corporation as a private-controlled agency for
wealth accumulation. Uncoupled from ‘market capitalism’ and
hitched to a more democratic vision, the institution of the
corporation can become a social, political and economic
organisation in which public, political and distributive ends are in
play as well as private, economic and productive ones. Berle and
Means’ The Modern Corporation has a definite contribution to
make to that project provided that its traditional reading is
abandoned and its more enlightened alternative theme is
emphasised; there must be a shift from ‘private property’ to
‘democratic accountability’ such that public policy is not only
consistent with private cupidity. When large corporations are
understood and analysed in the larger setting of democracy, it will
be possible to move forward. By carrying out such a democratic
stock-taking, it might then be possible to provide a more telling
critique of corporate governance and to offer more constructive
proposals for change. Indeed, it is only when corporations are
obliged to become part of, rather than remain apart from,
democratic society more broadly that progress will be made.
But the present conditions of decay and deterioration will only last
for short time. Given opportunities and intellectual backing, the
old habits and entrenched arrangements might re-assert
themselves. In the meantime, it is essential that those who take
the democratic imperative seriously act quickly and decisively;
the opportunity might not come again or soon. The seventy-fifth
anniversary of Adolph A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means’ The
Modern Corporation and Private Property could be celebrated in
no more fitting or timely way than with such a initiative. Indeed,
it might well be that, as goes corporate governance, so goes
democracy.

